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1. It is a common place that the way we live is founded 
largely on the way we choose to think. It is a significant 
element of our practices that there should be at least a 
specific relation connecting thought to each other. These 
relations are what enable one to speak about reasons to 
accept a given belief. This paper aims to gain some 
understanding of how our beliefs influence each other. Put 
in another way, my interest here is to improve our 
understanding of what is behind the acceptance criteria 
that make us inclined to hold or reject a belief. 
A possible way to handle this preoccupation is to accept 
the position that emerges from the last two sections of 
Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism. There he presents a 
point of view that tries to argue against the idea, common 
to several logical empiricists, that we have means to hold a 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. 
Quine aims to reject the idea that experience could on its 
own tell us something about how it should be incorporated 
in the web of our beliefs. He comments: 
No particular experiences are linked with any particular 
statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly 
through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field 
as a whole. (Quine 1953) 
Quine focuses on how a non-conceptual content1 – the 
given originated in our sensorial stimuli – can interfere in 
the articulation of our concepts. However, his way of 
thinking about how non-conceptual content relate to 
conceptual states could also be applied to the connections 
between different conceptual states.  
The argument in the Two Dogmas that I believe that 
leads to the above holism is the recognition that nothing 
prevents us to take as true any belief “if we make drastic 
enough adjustments elsewhere in the system”. In other 
words, we have indefinite ways to take seriously whatever 
is given through our senses; we can even face it as an 
episode of hallucination. My view is that this argument, as I 
commented before, would hold no matter if we are 
concerned with conceptual or non-conceptual contents. If I 
am right about this, it follows that if we accept, on this 
ground, that the given alone tells us nothing, it seems 
inevitable to accept also that a belief, by itself, tells us 
nothing. Accordingly, the argument of the Two Dogmas 
can be used even if we are inclined to reject what David-
son once called the third dogma.2 
In this form, holism tells us that non-conceptual contents 
can disturb, as much as conceptual content, any region of 
our thought. Therefore the Quinean argument tells us 
nothing about the very possibility to draw a line that 
bounds the influence of whatever content. Someone could 
accept his argument and say something like: «When we 
question whether the Newtonian theory is consistent to a 
certain experience of an inclined plane we place outside 
the sphere of doubt beliefs like ‘I like waterfalls more than 
                                                     
1
 By ‘non-conceptual content’ I aimed to refer to thought contents that are 
expected to be intelligible independently of whatever other thought content. An 
empiricist like Quine, for example, holds a non-conceptual content in the 
sense that he believes that our senses inform us about the world independ-
ently of any other content we happen to possess – our senses themselves 
make a difference. 
2
 That is, the idea that we can separate out conceptual scheme from empirical 
content (Davidson 1980) 
beaches’ or ‘these computers are faster than those’. When 
we take seriously a certain belief we always place some 
set of beliefs outside the range of doubt. Perhaps we have 
problems deciding if some beliefs are outside the sphere 
of doubt but, certainly, we can do this to many others». (I 
will henceforth refer to this line of argument as the 
'standard line'). 
Thus it seems reasonable to affirm that the argument 
found in the Two Dogmas gives no argument against the 
idea of postulated analytic statements. The kind of 
analytic/synthetic distinction against which Quine argues is 
one that claims only that there are statements that suffer 
no influence by experience whatsoever. But once we can 
draw the line of influence that a thinkable content exerts in 
our thought, someone could accept the Quinean argument 
and, at the same time, defend the existence of analytic 
statements if we can postulate them to be so. 
Thus, the message that holism presented along these 
lines seems to offer is that when we takes a new content 
into consideration we can in principle change any belief 
but, in practice, we can have a very different picture. We 
can be presented with statements that are to be held as 
postulates. In other words, Quine's arguments have very 
little to prevent the possibility that we take some state-
ments as not to be revised by fiat. 
2. If we are inclined to accept the Wittgensteinian 
argument concerning rule following, any talk of non-
conceptual content makes no sense. A non-conceptual 
content is independent of whatever other content that 
could constitute a rule. I understand the rule following 
argument (RFA) as presenting reasons against the 
possibility of a thinkable content determined by anything 
other a public practice. That is to say, rules can only be 
understood in relation to a set of shared practices. A 
statement can therefore make sense only within a set of 
statements and those have to refer to its role within a set 
of practices – its role is context- dependent. Contexts, 
themselves, cannot be defined without a reference to 
conceptual practices. Non-conceptual content is therefore 
in direct opposition to the very message of Wittgenstein's 
RFA. 
Therefore it follows that first, the RFA gives us good 
reasons to abandon the third dogma that Quine is 
committed to and, second, the Quinean argument in favor 
of holism is independent of accepting or not the third 
dogma. Another sort of holism seems to come up from the 
RFA; a holism that incorporates the critique to the notion of 
non-conceptual content. I would like to further argue that 
accepting the RFA has more to contribute to a sound 
version of holism. 
3. I believe there is no inconsistency in rejecting the third 
dogma while accepting the first two. In other words, I 
believe we can abandon the non-conceptual content idea 
while taking the consequences of holding the ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction. I would like to examine now 
whether a holism along the lines I sketched above – one 
that is grounded on Wittgenstein's RFA – leads us to a 
rejection of the third dogma and further makes it harder 
that we take some analytic statements as postulates. The 
issue here is to compare the consequences of these two 




versions of holism so that we can gain insight about how 
they differ.  
The talk on analytic statements as postulates bears on 
the assumption that the standard line holds. The standard 
line, in its turn, depends on an amount of control over the 
consequences of accepting some beliefs: that we could 
draw a line that would determine the reach of influence of 
these beliefs. The question here is to establish whether 
some criteria of acceptability of some statements, namely 
analytic statements that are postulate, are somehow 
influenced by empirical beliefs. I believe that accepting 
RFA leads to an image of our practices according to which 
our capacity to establish the consequences of what we 
think is far more limited than what the standard line seems 
to suggest. 
Moreover, those postulate analytic statements are 
understood differently against a background where the 
RFA holds and against a more strictly Quinean one. If we 
accept the RFA, a statement can only play an epistemic 
role within a specific context. As a consequence, to talk 
about analytic statements against this background is to 
imply that they act as such with respect to some contexts. 
(Surely, these contexts could involve several practices.) If 
any statement is to be taken as analytic within this RFA 
background, several others would have to follow it: no 
statement can be considered analytic in isolation.  
4. The RFA repels an image that seems prima facie 
attractive: the image that we can separate out our beliefs 
from the course of our practices. The image implies that 
we could have the same web of beliefs organized by our 
practices in different ways. The RFA goes against this idea 
in the sense that it faces this dualism as an instance of the 
dualism between the institution and the application of 
rules. If this latter dualism is rejected, the course of our 
practices cannot be distinguished from what we believe. 
Whatever makes us take a specific course of practices is 
determined by our beliefs. 
The alternative image that emerges from the RFA has 
that our criteria of acceptance are determined by our 
practices themselves and by nothing further. Changes in 
our ways of thinking are not independent from our 
practices; our beliefs do not constitute a separate realm 
isolated from our practices in general nor could they have 
a self-standing mechanism of evolution. It is therefore 
more appropriate to talk about relations among practices 
than about relations among beliefs for beliefs can only be 
understood if we can locate them in a practice.  
I have observed that against the background of the RFA 
no statement can be taken as analytic in isolation. This, in 
itself, constitutes no problem for the standard line. Within 
the standard line, we could argue that the statements that 
ground the one that is a candidate analytic statement are 
presuppositions behind this very statement and we have at 
least some capacity to make them explicit given a context. 
In a context of argument, we exercise precisely this 
capacity to recognize deductive relations among our 
beliefs in order to make sure that what we are putting 
forward is coherent. The RFA, on the other hand, entails 
that the statements that ground the candidate analytic 
statement are not only presuppositions.  
Accepting RFA leads us towards the idea that the use of 
any term must be reflected on previous practices where 
the term appears. A term has nothing else to it – our 
current use of the term can make reference to nothing but 
previous use. When we understand a term, we do not 
grasp a rule from a set of rules itself devoid of any 
practice. In fact, the rejection of a distinction between 
instances where the use is instituted and instances where 
it is applied leads us to take any new application of a 
concept as a slight change in the underlying meaning.  
When we use a term, we relate it to other terms, in a 
specific way (or, according to a rule). In any of our 
practices we make several connections among terms. Let 
us suppose, for example, that one attributes a specific 
image to the majority of children one sees. Suppose 
further that it is an image which discredits completely what 
these children say. It wouldn't be strange if, in the future, 
this person attributes this same image again to an unseen 
child. In this case, she would not do that because she 
knew how to understand a rule in a given moment and 
something else was added to her understanding in a later 
moment. The attribution of the image is not a decision 
taken after her understanding of the meaning of “child”. 
Nothing less than all our understanding is originated from 
our practices. 
However, the above example concerns a specific 
relation. Actually the use of terms within our practices 
assumes a more intricate structure. The more a vocabulary 
relates to a greater number of heterogeneous terms the 
more it is hard to draw a line of influence for this vocabu-
lary. My claim is that the empirical beliefs are formed by a 
vocabulary of this kind. Empirical beliefs – and therefore 
empirical vocabularies – are present in a diversity of 
moments in our lives. 3The very capacity of detect all 
consequences of our empirical beliefs is not supported by 
argument. 
So I think that we have no more than a partial capacity 
to detect the impact of our empirical beliefs. Thus, if we 
accept the RFA an analytic statement could be considered 
as such only as a conjecture. However, someone could 
question if the RFA has any force against the idea of 
analytic statements as postulate if interpreted in a 
instrumentalist way. I believe that it has nothing to say 
about this. However, a Wittgensteinian route to holism, 
more than a Quinean one, seems to encourage a strong 
suspicion towards any attempt to split our thinking in 
compartments. Whatever our thinking does, it does 
because it establishes connections.  
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3
 One way to recognize this is to think in the constant presence of a kind of 
empirical propositions what once Wittgenstein called ‘propositions that stand 
fast’ (Wittgenstein 1969). 
